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THE DEMISE OF THE COMMERCIAL SPEECH
DOCTRINE AND THE REGULATION OF
PROFESSIONAL'S ADVERTISING: THE VIRGINIA
PHARMACY CASE
The first amendment to the United States Constitution provides
that "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press."' Although the first amendment protects a
wide variety of activities, 2 commercial advertising was never ac-
corded this protection. The commercial speech doctrine provides gen-
erally that any expression which is primarily commercial is not pro-
tected by the first amendment and may be regulated by the states
consistent with the due process clause.' From its inception, the doc-
trine was ambiguous, difficult to apply, and engendered much con-
troversy and comment.4 In recent years the commercial speech doc-
trine has been weakened by several cases that have restricted the
doctrine's application and broadened the first amendment protection
that some commercial speech would receive.- The Supreme Court in
Virginia Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc.6 finally put the doctrine to rest by holding that commercial
speech, like other forms of expression, is entitled to full first amend-
ment protection.
7
Early Supreme Court cases recognized the State's power to regu-
late commercial advertising, but did not address the extent of first
amendment protection, if any, to which commercial advertising was
entitled.' The first statement by the Supreme Court on that issue
' U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2 E.g. Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969) (flag burning); Stanley v. Georgia,
394 U.S. 557 (1969) (possession of pornographic materials); West Virginia Bd. of Edu-
cation v. Barnett, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (refusal to salute flag); Jamison v. Texas, 318
U.S. 413 (1943) (religious solicitation). See generally Richards, The Historical Ration-
ale of the Speech-And-Press Clause of the First Amendment, 21 U. FLA. L. REv. 203
(1969); Note, 48 TUL. L. REv. 426 (1974).
Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951); Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316
U.S. 52 (1942).
' See, e.g., Note, 2 BIL. OF RIGHTS RaV. 222 (1942); Note, 8 OHIo ST. U. L. J. 331
(1942). But see RESNIK, Freedom of Speech and Commercial Solicitation, 30 CALIF. L.
REv. 655 (1942); Note, 26 MIN. L. Rav. 895 (1942).
5 Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975); Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh
Commission on Human Relations, 412 U.S. 376 (1973).
£ 96 S. Ct. 1817 (1976).
Id. at 1824. See text accompanying notes 48-68 infra.
Packer Corp. v. Utah, 285 U.S. 105 (1932); Fifth Avenue Coach Co. v. New York,
221 U.S. 467 (1911). These cases did not reach the specific issue of first amendment
246 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXIV
came in the Handbill Cases.' These cases involved attempts by local
municipalities to prohibit Jehovah's Witnesses from distributing
handbills on the streets. In the Handbill Cases, the Court held that
an ordinance banning the distribution of all handbills and literature
was an unconstitutional abridgement of the freedom of speech.10
Although the Handbill Cases did not deal directly with commer-
cial speech," dicta in the cases indicated that the Supreme Court
would not grant full first amendment protection to speech in a strictly
commercial context.2 The Court squarely faced the issue of the de-
gree of first amendment protection for commercial speech in
Valentine v. Chrestensen. '3 Chrestensen wished to distribute a com-
mercial handbill in the streets. After the police informed him that a
city ordinance prohibited such a distribution, Chrestensen appended
a protest to the back of the handbill in an effort to evade the ordi-
nance." The police would not allow him to distribute this revised
handbill and Chrestensen sought an injunction to restrain enforce-
ment of the statute. 5 The district court granted a permanent injunc-
tion'" and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court re-
protection for commercial advertising. For example, the real issue in Packer was
whether Utah's exception of newspapers from a general ban on tobacco advertising
violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 285 U.S. at 108.
Schneider v. Town of Irvington, 308 U.S. 147 (1939); Lovell v. City of Griffin,
303 U.S. 444 (1938).
308 U.S. at 163; 303 U.S. at 451.
Several cases with similar facts were joined for decision in Schneider. The
handbills in the various cases contained a variety of information. One handbill carried
a statement by a labor union with respect to a local employer. 308 U.S. at 155. Another
handbill announced a protest meeting in connection with the administration of state
unemployment insurance. Id. at 156. The third handbill contained religious informa-
tion distributed by Jehovah's Witnesses. Id. at 158. In Lovell, the handbill contained
religious information similar to the third handbill in Schneider. 303 U.S. at 448.
12 In Schneider, the Court noted that their holding did not imply that commercial
soliciting and canvassing may not be regulated. 308 U.S. at 165.
13 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
IA The protest that Chrestensen appended to his original handbill concerned the
refusal by the city docks commissioner to allow Chrestensen to dock his submarine at
any city owned wharf. 316 U.S. at 53.
'5 Id.
Chrestensen v. Valentine, 34 F. Supp. 596, 600 (S.D.N.Y. 1940), aff'd 122 F.2d
511 (2d Cir. 1941), rev'd 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
'1 Chrestensen v. Valentine, 122 F.2d 511, 516 (2d Cir. 1941). While the court of
appeals refused to decide whether any prohibition of commercial advertising is invalid
under the first amendment, they held than any prohibition of a combined protest and
advertisement could not be valid under the first amendment. Id. at 516. The court
believed that any distinction between communication that was primarily commercial
and primarily non-commercial was uncertain because the determination involved ele-
COMMERCIAL SPEECH DOCTRINE
versed declaring that although the states cannot unduly burden the
use of the streets for the dissemination of information and opinion,
the Constitution "imposes no such restraint on [the] Government as
respects purely commercial advertising."'"
A comparison of Chrestensen and the Handbill Cases supports the
inference that the first amendment does not protect commercial
speech.'9 In the Handbill Cases, ordinances that prohibited the distri-
bution of all handbills violated the first amendment. In Chrestensen
an ordinance prohibiting the distribution of all commercial handbills
did not violate the first amendment. Thus, a predominate commer-
cial element was dispositive in resolving whether to extend first
amendment protection.
The commercial speech doctrine became firmly established dur-
ing the twenty years following Chrestensen. The doctrine was
strengthened in Breard v. City of Alexandria0 where the Court up-
held a local ordinance that prohibited door-to-door solicitation with-
out the homeowner's prior consent. Previously the Court had struck
down an ordinance that prohibited door-to-door religious solicita-
tion.' The Breard Court distinguished this situation by noting that
in Breard "the selling . . . brings into the transaction a commercial
feature" and thus receives no first amendment protection.
2
ments of both a subjective and objective test. Id. at 515. Judge Frank lodged a spirited
dissent. Essentially, he saw the handbill as separate statements of protest and adver-
tising. Viewed in this way, the advertisement can be severed from the protest without
any chilling effect. Id. at 517 (Frank, J., dissenting). In cases in which these two
elements can not be so easily separated, the purpose of the speaker would be disposi-
tive. Id. at 521 (Frank, J., dissenting).
316 U.S. at 54.
" Note, The Commercial Speech Doctrine: The First Amendment at a Discount,
41 BROOKLYN L. REv. 60, 67 (1974); Note, Freedom of the Press-The Commercial
Speech Doctrine Applied to Abortion Advertisements, 24 EMORY L. J. 1165, 1168
(1975).
341 U.S. 622 (1951). In Breard, appellant solicited subscriptions door-to-door for
nationally known magazines. Appellant was arrested while going door-to-door because
he did not seek the owners' permission. Id. at 624. The Court upheld the ordinance
forbidding such conduct by balancing the right of privacy of the homeowner against
the first amendment rights of the magazine publisher. Id. at 641.
22 Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943). The city of Struthers, Ohio,
had an ordinance that prohibited all door-to-door solicitation. The Supreme Court
held the ordinance unconstitutional and reversed the convictions of several Jehovah's
Witnesses who had violated it. The Court held that a state may not prohibit the
dissemination of otherwise protected information when there is a speaker and a willing
listener. Id. at 146-47. The defect in the ordinance was its blanket prohibition of all
solicitation thereby preventing those residents who wished to receive this information
door-to-door from doing so. Id. at 147. See also note 48 infra.
341 U.S. at 642. Chrestensen and Breard implied that any expression that is sold
1977]
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After Breard, lower courts mechanically applied the commercial
speech doctrine, holding that all commercial speech was unpro-
tected.? This rote acceptance of the doctrine continued until New
or includes a commercial solicitation of any degree is without first amendment protec-
tion. The Court certainly did not intend this result. See Smith v. California, 361 U.S.
147, 150 (1959) (books); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501-02 (1952)
(movies); Grossjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936) (newspapers). The
Supreme Court held that the above media were entitled to first amendment protection
even though they were sold for a profit. See also Note, Commercial Speech - An End
in Sight for CHRESTENSEN?, 23 DEPAUL L. REv. 1258, 1266 (1974). The Chrestensen and
Breard decisions indicate the Court's reluctance to afford first amendment protection
to commercial speech. If an expression was "purely commercial," as in Breard, or had
a primarily commercial motive, as in Chrestensen, it would not fall within the protec-
tion of the first amendment. The Court, however, offered little guidance in either case
as to the application of the doctrine. Nevertheless, the cases show that when the
activity involves religious proselytization the first amendment will operate to protect
the activity, irrespective of any commercial solicitation involved as well. Compare
Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) and Schneider v. Town of Irvington,
308 U.S. 147 (1939) with Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951) and Valentine v.
Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942). In Murdock, the Court overturned a local ordinance
that prohibited the door-to-door dissemination of information without a license. The
Court noted that the fact that religious literature is sold does not transform its distri-
bution into a commercial enterprise. 319 U.S. at 111. In Schneider, the Court similarly
overturned an ordinance prohibiting the dissemination of information and literature
in the streets by a religious group. These holdings contrast with Breard and
Chrestensen where the Court upheld similar ordinances when applied to commercial
solicitation and advertising.
2 See, e.g., Polack v. Public Util. Comm'n, 191 F.2d 450, 457 (D.C. Cir. 1951),
rev'd on other grounds, 343 U.S. 451 (1953); Halsted v. SEC, 182 F.2d 660, 668-69 (D.C.
Cir. 1950); United Advertising Corp. v. Borough of Raritan, 11 N.J. 144, 93 A.2d 362,
366 (1952); Slater v. Salt Lake City, 115 Utah 476, 206 P.2d 153, 158 (1949). Other
courts have attempted a more analytical approach by inquiring into the speaker's
purpose. E.g., People v. Uffindell, 90 Cal.2d 881, 202 P.2d 874 (App. Dept. Super. Ct.
1949) (plaintiff was engaged in commercial activity for profit and therefore the ordi-
nance regulating handbills was held constitutional); People ex rel Greenberg v. Healy,
74 N.Y.S. 2d 102 (Mag. Ct. 1947) (statute regulating handbills was unconstitutional
when applied to a labor union because its activity was not for a commercial purpose);
Kenyon v. City of Chicopee, 320 Mass. 448, 70 N.E.2d 241 (1946) (an activity with a
religious purpose cannot be regulated as commercial activity); Commonwealth v.
Akmakjian, 316 Mass. 97, 55 N.E.2d 6 (1944) (statute could regulate activities of
salesmen but not activities of a registered minister carrying out a religious duty); State
v. Van Daalan, 69 S.D. 466, 11 N.W.2d 523 (1943) (if an activity is carried out with a
religious purpose, it cannot be regulated as a commercial activity; the fact that reli-
gious literature is sold does not render it commercial). This approach is not entirely
satisfactory. When a religious group distributes literature for a donation they are
engaging in both religious and commercial solicitation. Religious proselytization is a
protected activity but commercial solicitation is not protected. See text accompanying
note 22 supra.Moreover, an inquiry into the speaker's purpose begs the question of the
definition of commercial speech. For instance, a passerby stopped by a religious zealot
COMMERCIAL SPEECH DOCTRINE
York Times v. Sullivan.24 There the Court held that an advertisement
in the newspaper which "communicated information, expressed opin-
ion, recited grievances, protested claimed abuses and sought finan-
cial support" for a movement of the highest public importance was
entitled to first amendment protection.2 This was the first attempt
by the Supreme Court to define the boundaries of the commercial
speech doctrine.2 Th Court's test created difficulties in the subse-
and solicited for a donation may view the activity as "purely commercial" but the
zealot may believe that he is furthering his religious belief. A court would have a
difficult task in separating the believers and the capitalists from among the "zealots".
Jehovah's Witnesses regard the public distribution of literature as the work of God.
Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 108 (1943). Passersby who are solicited do not
always regard it as such. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 309 (1940). In some
cases the behavior of the zealot is so overreaching that his conduct will be subject to
censure notwithstanding its religious context. Chaplinksy v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S.
568 (1942).
24 376 U.S. 254 (1964). The Court recognized that advertising can convey non-
commercial information making an analysis of the content of the advertisement neces-
sary in commercial speech cases. Id. at 266. The Committee to Defend Martin Luther
King published a full page advertisement in the New York Times reciting certain
incidents, criticizing unnamed public officials in the South, and soliciting contribu-
tions for the civil rights movement. Id. at 257. Some of the statements were factually
inaccurate. For example, the advertisement claimed that certain students were ex-
pelled from school for singing the national anthem on the steps of the state capitol
when, in reality, they sang "My Country 'Tis of Thee." Id. at 258-59. Also, the adver-
tisement claimed that Dr. King had been arrested seven times when the number of
arrests was actually four. Id. It would be a mistake, however, to conclude that the
falsity of the statements was harmless. The common law of defamation measures the
defense of truth against very strict standards. Even though the inaccuracies seem
minor they could constitute libel. Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on the
Central Meaning of the First Amendment, 1964 SuP. CT. REv. 191. [Hereinafter cited
as Kalven].
Sullivan, the Commissioner of Public Affairs of Montgomery, Alabama, brought
a libel action against the four Alabama clergymen who signed the advertisement and
the New York Times. 376 U.S. at 256. The Times contended that the advertisement
was protected from libel suits by the First Amendment. Sullivan, however, argued that
the advertisement was commercial and thus beyond the scope of the first amendment's
protection. The Court rejected Sullivan's argument saying that the advertisement in
question was not commercial in the same sense that the word was used in Chrestensen.
Id. at 266.
376 U.S. at 266.
21 In addition to its importance to the commercial speech doctrine, New York
Times is a major case in other areas of constitutional law. New York Times has been
interpreted as ending the clear and present danger test and replacing the balancing
test with an information analysis. See Kalven, supra note 24 at 213-14. In addition,
New York Times restricted the speech that a state could punish as libel and made
seditious libel impossible. See Brennan, The Supreme Court and the Meickeljohn
Interpretation of the First Amendment, 79 HARv. L. REv. 1, 15 (1965); See also Emer-
son, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877 (1963).
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quent application of the doctrine. Logically, the information analysis
used by the Court could be extended so that even advertisements as
in Chrestensen would fall within the protection of the first amend-
ment. 2 Thus, while attempting a clarification of the commercial
speech doctrine, New York Times only served to weaken its funda-
mental principle.
28
A subsequent erosion of the doctrine took place in Pittsburgh
Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations.2 9 In
2 New York Times suggests that advertisements that convey a social protest will
receive first amendment protection. 376 U.S. at 266. Chrestensen's handbill contained
a protest against the city docks commissioner. See tpxt accompanying note 14 supra.
Thus under a strict reading of New York Times, Chrestensen's handbill should have
received first amendment protection. New York Times, however, may apply only to
advertisements that convey information of the "highest public importance" and thus
no different result would have been reached in Chrestensen. 376 U.S. at 266. A test of
this kind places the courts in the difficult position of weighing the social significance
of different types of information.
The importance of the New York Times decision does not lie in its immediate
effect on the commercial speech doctrine. The case did not define commercial speech
and formulated a test so restrictive that its effect on the commercial speech doctrine
was negligible. The Court recognized, however, that advertising can convey non-
commercial information. Id. This recognition of the informative function of advertising
places advertising within a theoretical framework in which first amendment issues may
be raised and decided. See, e.g., Business Executives Move for Viet Nam Peace v.
FCC, 450 F.2d 642, 658 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (advertising not protected because it does not
express ideas); Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
842 (1969). The Banzhaf court noted that
Promoting the sale of a product is not ordinarily associated with any
of the interests the First Amendment seeks to protect. . . . [It] does
not affect the political process, does not contribute to the exchange of
ideas, does not provide information on matters of public importance
and is not . . . a form of individual self-expression.
405 F.2d at 1101-02. But see Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 41 (1971)
("Self-governance in the United States presupposes far more than knowledge and
debate about the strictly official activities of various levels of government"); Time, Inc.
v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388 (1967) ("guarantees for speech and press are not the preserve
of political expression or comment upon public affairs"). See Note, Freedom of Expres-
sion in a Commercial Context, 78 HARV. L. Rav. 1191, 1194 (1965); Note, The First
Amendment and Consumer Protection: Commercial Advertising as Protected Speech,
50 ORE. L. REV. 177, 188 (1972). See generally Thompson, Advertising and the FTC:
The Role of Information in a Free-Enterprise Economy, 6 ANTITRUST L. & ECON. J. 73
(1973) [hereinafter cited as Thompson].
- 413 U.S. 376 (1973). In Pittsburgh Press the National Organization of Women
(NOW) filed a complaint with the Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations charg-
ing that the Pittsburgh Press Company violated a municipal ordinance by arranging
help-wanted advertisements in Male and Female columns of the classified pages. The
Human Relations Commission concluded that the Pittsburgh Press Company was in
violation of the ordinance and issued a cease and desist order. Id. at 379. The order
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Pittsburgh Press, the Court employed the New York Times analysis
and concluded that the employment advertisement did not convey
information concerning public issues.? In addition, the Court stated
that because the advertisements also furthered illegal activity they
would not be entitled to first amendment protection.3 ' Speech pro-
moting an illegal enterprise had long been considered unprotected by
the first amendment.32 The Court's discussion implied that commer-
cial speech may be entitled to first amendment protection when it
furthers legal activities.3
Both Pittsburgh Press and New York Times attempted clarifica-
tions of the commercial speech doctrine, but neither succeeded. In-
stead, these two cases weakened the once firm principle and intensi-
fied the mounting criticism of the doctrine." This criticism appeared
was affirmed by the Court of Common Pleas. Id. at 380. The Commonwealth Court
on appeal narrowed the order somewhat but barred "all reference to sex in employment
advertising column headings." Id. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied review
and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. Id. at 381.
Id. at 385. The Pittsburgh Press Court emphasized the dissimilarity between
the advertisements in Pittsburgh Press and the appellant's advertisement in New York
Times. The Court ruled that none of the advertisements stated an opinion as to
whether certain positions should be filled by members of one sex or the other. Rather,
they merely offered employment. Thus, the advertisements were "classic examples"
of commercial speech. Id. at 385.
1' Id. at 389. The Court posited the legal/illegal distinction in response to an
argument by the petitioner that commercial speech should be accorded a higher level
of protection than it received previously. The court responded by saying that advertise-
ments for other illegal activities, notably prostitution and the sale of narcotics, could
be regulated constitutionally. 413 U.S. at 388. Although, the illegal activity furthered
in the Pittsburgh Press advertisement is less overt, it is nonetheless illegal and should
not receive greater protection than advertisements for other illegal services. Id. at 388-
89.
" See, e.g., Holiday Magic Inc. v. Warren, 357 F. Supp. 20, 26 (E.D. Wis. 1973),
where the district judge noted: "Just as solicitation of murder is regulable, though only
speech is involved, so is the promotion of an unlawful commercial activity. In both
cases the speech is inseparably related to the particular unlawful activity and not
remotely related to the . . . purposes of the First Amendment."
0 See Note, Commercial Speech - An End in Sight for Chrestensen? 23 DEPAUL
L. REV. 1258 (1974). In Pittsburgh Press the Court stated
Any First Amendment interest which might be served by advertising
an ordinary commercial proposal and which might arguably outweigh
the governmental interest supporting the regulation is altogether ab-
sent when the commercial activity itself is illegal and the restriction
on advertising is incidental to a valid restriction on economic activity.
413 U.S. at 389.
11 The criticism of the commercial speech doctrine came primarily from two Su-
preme Court Justices. Justice Douglas, who was on the Court when Chrestensen was
decided and who voted with the majority at that time, reversed his position and
19771
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to reach its peak in Bigelow v. Virginia.35 In Bigelow the Supreme
Court overturned the conviction under Virginia law of a newspaper
editor who published an advertisement for an abortion service in New
York. The Court characterized Chrestensen as a "distinctly limited
holding" that regulated only the manner of commercial advertising.',
The Bigelow Court concluded that the first amendment protected the
advertisement because it "conveyed information of potential interest
to a diverse audience" about an activity that was legal in another
state." The Court combined the "public issue" rationale of New York
Times with the legality distinction of Pittsburgh Press to create a new
test for the application of the commercial speech doctrine.3 1 More-
over, the Bigelow Court effectively overruled Chrestensen by nar-
rowly restricting its holding to the manner of distributing handbills. 9
Following Bigelow, there was a split of opinion as to whether that
case marked the end of the commercial speech doctrine. 0 The "public
subsequently criticized that holding. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Grove, 404 U.S. 898
(1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari); Cammarano v. United
States, 358 U.S. 498 (1959) (Douglas, J., concurring). Justice Brennan had also ex-
pressed doubt as to the validity of the commercial speech doctrine. Lehman v. City of
Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also United States
v. Pellegrino, 467 F.2d 41 (9th Cir. 1972).
- 421 U.S. 809 (1975). Bigelow, the managing editor of a weekly mewspaper,
published the advertisement of a New York organization announcing that abortion was
legal and available in New York state. The organization offered its services, for a fee,
in arranging abortions in New York hospitals. Id., at 812. Bigelow was convicted of
violating a Virginia statute that made it a misdemeanor to encourage or prompt the
processing of an abortion. The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed Bigelow's convic-
tion. Bigelow v. Commonwealth, 213 Va. 191, 191 S.E.2d 173 (1972). Bigelow appealed
this decision to the Supreme Court. During the time his appeal was pending, the Court
decided Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
These two cases held that at certain stages of pregnancy a state may not unduly restrict
a woman's right to an abortion. 410 U.S. at 164. Accordingly, the Court vacated
Bigelow's conviction and remanded the case for further consideration in view of Roe
andDoe. 413 U.S. 909 (1973). The Virginia Supreme Court found nothing in those two
decisions to alter their holding and affirmed Bigelow's conviction. 214 Va. 341, 342,
200 S.E.2d 680, 680 (1973). See Note, The First Amendment and Commercial Advertis-
ing: Bigelow v. Commonwealth, 60 VA. L. REv. 154 (1974). The Supreme Court of the
United States then noted probable jurisdiction to review the first amendment issue.
418 U.S. 909 (1974).
3' 421 U.S. at 819. The Bigelow Court stated that merely because Chrestensen had
the effect of banning a particular handbill, the case is not authority for the proposition
that advertising is unprotected per se. Id.
3 421 U.S. at 822.
Id.
3' Id. at 819.
so Compare Note, The First Amendment Status of Commercial Advertising, 54
N.C. L. REv. 468 (1974) and Note, Freedom of Speech Protection for Commercial
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issue" rationale of New York Times arguably remained valid because
of the subject matter of the advertisement in Bigelow. The abortion
issue, like the civil rights movement of the 1960's, was an issue of "the
highest public importance."'" If the Court meant to provide a first
amendment test to apply to commercial speech, the opinion offered
little guidance. The Court intimated that a balancing test would be
an appropriate method to determine the first amendment value of
commercial speech.4 2 Rather than demonstrating the type of social
interests that commercial speech furthers, the Court focused exclu-
sively on the lack of any legitimate state interests in the regulation
of commercial speech. 3 Thus, Bigelow offers little guidance for the
application of its balancing test in situations that are not factually
similar. In spite of its apparently far reaching effect, Bigelow failed
to clarify many of the uncertainties that surrounded the commercial
speech doctrine. Nevertheless, the Court did hold that advertising
may be subject to reasonable regulation that serves a legitimate pub-
lic interest."
After Bigelow, some hope remained for the continuing validity of
the commercial speech doctrine. Any such hope disappeared after
Virginia Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Advertising, 42 TENN. L. Rav. 573 (1975) with Comment, Prohibition of Abortion
Referral Advertising Held Unconstitutional, 61 CORNELL L. Rav. 640 (1976) and Note,
Freedom of the Press, The Commercial Speech Doctrine Applied to Abortion
Advertisements, 24 EMORY L. Ray. 1168 (1975).
11 See text accompanying notes 23-27 supra.
12 The test employed by the Bigelow Court to determine the validity of the restric-
tion balances the individual and social interest in the expression against the state's
interest in the regulation. See, e.g., Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control
Bd., 367 U.S. 1 (1961); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). The test represents
the usual approach to first amendment problems. See Emerson, Toward a General
Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L. J. 877 (1963). But see, Braden v. United
States, 365 U.S. 431 (1961).
'= The Court found that the advertisement did not affect the quality of medical
care in the Commonwealth which was a legitimate concern. 421 U.S. at 827. The Court
also expressed concern that a state could exert power over publications with a national
circulation if the prosecution by Virginia was allowed. Id. at 829.
11 421 U.S. at 826. Bigelow was also criticized as a retreat from the standards of
New York Times and Pittsburgh Press. Comment, Prohibition of Abortion Referral
Advertising Held Unconstitutional, 61 CORNEL L. Rav. 640 (1976). New York Times
and Pittsburgh Press would allow state regulation only to further a compelling state
interest. 421 U.S. at 826. Conceivably, Bigelow would lower the standard that state
regulation of speech would have to meet. The reference apparently was to the type of
regulation rather than to the type of interest. See, e.g., Lehman v. City of Shaker
Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (local ordinance that barred all political advertising on
public transportation vehicles upheld).
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Inc. The plaintiffs45 contended that a portion of a Virginia statute"
that prohibited pharmacists from advertising violated their first
amendment right to receive information." The defendant responded
45 96 S. Ct. 1817 (1976).
11 Id. at 1821. The plaintiffs were a daily user of prescription drugs, the AFL-CIO,
and the Virginia Citizens Consumers Council, Inc. Id.
'7 VA. CODE ANN. § 54-524.35. (1974 Repl. Vol.) The statute provides that:
Any pharmacist shall be considered guilty of unprofessional con-
duct who. . . (2) issues, publishes, broadcasts by radio, or otherwise,
or distributes or uses in any way whatsoever advertising matter in
which statements are made about his professional service which have
a tendency to deceive or defraud the public, contrary to the public
health and welfare; or (3) publishes, advertises or promotes, directly
or indirectly, in any manner whatsoever, any amount, price, fee,
premium, discount, rebate or credit terms for professional services or
for drugs containing narcotics or for any drugs which may be dis-
pensed only by prescription.
This was not the first attack on the statute. In Patterson Drug Co. v. Kingery,
305 F. Supp. 821 (W.D. Va. 1969), a drug retailing company and one of its pharmacists
challenged the statute. The district court upheld the statute as a reasonable exercise
of the state's police power in an area that affects the public health, safety, and welfare.
Id. at 824-25. This decision was not appealed. In Virginia Pharmacy, the district court
distinguished Kingery by saying that "[the plaintiffs here] are consumers; their con-
cern is fundamentally deeper than a trade consideration." Thus their right to receive
drug price information removed any commercial speech restrictions. Virginia Citizens
Consumers Council, Inc. v. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 373 F. Supp. 683, 686 (E.D. Va.
1973).
18 The right to receive information can be traced to Martin v. City of Struthers,
319 U.S. 141 (1943). There the Supreme Court overturned a local ordinance that
banned all door-to-door solicitation as violative of the first amendment. See text ac-
companying note 21 supra. The Court stated that "freedom of speech necessarily
protects the right to receive [speech]." 319 U.S. at 143. The right to receive informa-
tion was further developed in subsequent cases. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965) (contraceptive information); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946)
(religious information); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945) (labor union organiz-
ing). In recent years, the Supreme Court has held that the criminalization of mere
possession of obscene materials was unconstitutional because the right to receive infor-
mation protected the materials, Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); that the right
to receive information is essential to the fairness doctrine as applied to the broadcast
media, Red Lion Broadcasting Corp. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969); and that the right
to receive information guarantees the right to receive Communist propaganda through
the mails, Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965). In contrast to Lamont,
however, the Supreme Court held in Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972), that
the Attorney General could exclude a foreign Marxist without violating any first
amendment right to receive information. The court noted that to allow the alleged first
amendment interests to predominate would nullify the sovereign power to exclude
aliens. Id. at 768. Thus, after Mandel, the strength of the right to receive information
was in doubt. The Mandel decision apparently represented the Court's deference to
the power of the executive to exclude aliens rather than any dilution of the right to
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by saying that prescription advertising was commercial speech and
thus freely regulable. The Supreme Court found that, because com-
mercial speech resembled other forms of protected speech, there was
no justification for denying it first amendment protection, and ac-
cordingly held the statute unconstitutional."
receive information. Presumably, once Mandel was in the country, the plaintiffs could
not be prevented from hearing him. Note, The Right to Receive and The Commercial
Speech Doctrine: New Constitutional Considerations, 63 GEO. L.J. 775 (1975).
The right to receive information otherwise may be limited. In Zemel v. Rusk, 381
U.S. 1 (1965), the Court upheld the State Department's denial of a visa to visit Cuba
in spite of the plaintiff's assertion that the denial violated his right to receive informa-
tion. The Court noted that such an argument would not automatically dispose of a case
because almost any legitimate regulation may be attacked as decreasing the flow of
information. 381 U.S. at 8. See also Note, State Statute Prohibiting Pharmacists From
Publishing Prescription Drug Prices Violates Consumer's Right to Know, 23 KANSAS
L. REV. 289 (1975); Comment, The First Amendment and the Public Right to
Information, 35 U. Pirr. L. REv. 93 (1973).
The right was clarified most recently in Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396
(1974), where a rule relating to the censorship of prisoner mail was held to be violative
of the first amendment. The Court relied on the right of non-inmates to receive the
prisoner's mail to overturn the rule:
[clommunication by letter is not accomplished by the act of writing
words on paper. Rather it is effected only when the letter is read by
the addressee. Both parties to the correspondence have an interest in
securing that result, and censorship of the communication between
them necessarily infringes on the interests of each.
416 U.S. at 408.
The Supreme Court in Virginia Pharmacy acknowledged the right to receive infor-
mation but did not rest its decision on the theory. The Court stated that, where a
speaker exists, first amendment protection is afforded "to the communication, to its
source and its recipients both." 96 S. Ct. at 1823. The parties stipulated that absent
the statute in question some pharmacists would advertise. Thus, a speaker (advertiser)
exists and the Court concluded that "if there is a right to advertise, there is a reciprocal
right to receive that advertising. Id. This formulation made an inquiry into the com-
mercial speech doctrine necessary. The district court apparently would require the
interests of the recipients of the advertising to be balanced against the commercial
nature of the advertisements. The Supreme Court rejected this approach. If the right
to receive information would substantiate a first amendment challenge, even though
the particular expression itself has no first amendment protection, then the rights of
the listeners would rise above the rights of the speaker. This would conflict with
Procunier where the Court extended first amendment protection to the combined
interests of the listener and the speaker in the communication rather than to the rights
of any individual party to the communication.
11 96 S. Ct. at 1830. The Virginia Pharmacy Court criticized any mechanistic
application of the commercial speech doctrine. The Court noted that "some fragment
of hope for the continuing validity of [the commercial speech doctrine] might have
persisted" after the Bigelow decision. Id. at 1825. Virginia Pharmacy, however, placed
the question of the doctrine's continuing validity squarely before the Court. The Court
stated that pharmacists who desire to advertise, do not wish to speak on any social or
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The Court arrived at its conclusion by balancing the comparative
interests of advertisers, consumers, and society in the advertisements
against the interest of the state in the regulation. 0 The Court found
the pharmacist's interest in the advertisements to be economic. Eco-
nomic interests, however, have not disqualified the speech of labor
disputants from first amendment protection.5' Thus, the Court found
no valid basis to distinguish commercial speech from other protected
speech solely because the speech was economic in nature.
2
The Court then shifted its focus to the interests of consumers in
prescription advertising and found that consumers with fixed or small
incomes have a strong interest in the free flow of price information
since it would allow them to patronize pharmacies with the lowest
prices. When the Court examined society's interest in the advertis-
ment, it found the essential link between commercial speech and
other forms of protected speech; both types of speech convey informa-
tion.5' Theoretically, speech is accorded first amendment protection
when it conveys information necessary to the exercise of our duties
as citizens, allowing a reasoned and intelligent decision on public
issues. 5 Commercial speech performs this same decision-making
political topic. Rather, the communication is simply "I will sell you the X prescription
drug at the Y price." Id. Thus, the question before the Court was whether commercial
speech was wholly outside the first amendment. The Court noted that speech does not
lose its first amendment protection because of its commercial form. Buckley v. Valeo,
96 S. Ct. 612 (1976); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); Cantwell v. Connecticut,
310 U.S. 296 (1940). See cases cited in note 26 supra. Thus, any distinction between
commercial and otherwise protected speech must be based on its content. 96 S. Ct. at
1825.
'Id.
" The first amendment protects the speech of parties to a labor dispute even
though this speech is directed toward an economic end. See, e.g., Thomas v. Collins,
323 U.S. 516 (1945); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1938). Commercial speech is
directed toward an economic end; the sale of the advertiser's product at a profit. The
Court found no satisfactory distinction between the forms of speech so as to afford the
former protection and deny protection to the latter. 96 S. Ct. at 1826.
52 96 S. Ct. at 1826.
'3 Id. The Court noted the forced choice that many consumers, particularly the
aged, had to make in purchasing prescription drugs because of a lack of advertising
information. Id. at 1826-27 n. 18. The aged spend more than twice the amount per
capita for prescription drugs than all other age groups. Almost 17% suffer from some
form of chronic condition. Thus the aged have a recurring need for prescription drugs
but generally do not have the resources to conduct the extensive investigation into drug
prices that a lack of price information makes imperative. Id.
96 S. Ct. at 1827.
Meickeljohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT. REv. 245.
Professor Meickeljohn believed that the Constitution created a unique form of self-
government by the people of the United States. He viewed the first amendment as a
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function. In a free-market economy, commercial information is neces-
sary so that consumers may make intelligent choices in the market-
place.56 Without an adequate supply of price and product informa-
tion, consumers are forced to make blind choices. Thus, like speech
concerning general political or social topics, commercial speech must
be protected to preserve a system of free and independent choice. 57
Protected speech may be restricted, however, if the interests of the
state in the regulation outweigh the first amendment interests in the
expression. 8 In this regard, the state in Virginia Pharmacy contended
that the professional standards of pharmacists would be lowered if
advertising were allowed. 9 The Supreme Court observed that profes-
sional standards may be maintained in ways other than the prohibi-
tion of advertising."0 Any prohibition on advertising would only fur-
ther insulate the already substandard pharmacist from price compe-
tition. The board also contended that the pharmacist who renders
device to ensure that voting, the means of self-government, would be an informed
process. Id. at 254. The first amendment would protect speech which tends to inform
and enlighten citizens in voting. Id. See also A. MEICKELJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS
RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948).
96 S. Ct. at 1827. See generally Thompson, supra note 28 at 73.
'7 96 S. Ct. at 1827. See Redish, The First Amendment in the Marketplace: Com-
mercial Speech and the Values of Free Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 429, 435
(1971); See also Thompson, supra note 28 at 77.
11 See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (Congress' interest in
maintaining military force outweighs citizen's interest in symbolic protest); Kovacs v.
Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (interest of State in protecting homeowner's right to privacy
outweighs interest of speaker using sound truck in residential area to broadcast ideas).
5' 96 S. Ct. at 1828. The pharmacy board specifically contended that if price
advertising were allowed, pharmacists would buy "in bulk" in order to maintain a large
inventory. If the drugs were left on the shelf too long, the drugs would lose their
potency. Consumers may then be forced to buy drugs which may not be effective.
Additionally, the board contended that, since consumers will now "shop around" for
the pharmacists with the lowest prices, any continuing relationship with one pharma-
cist will be destroyed. Accordingly, a pharmacist would be unable to monitor his
customer's prescriptions. Id. See Supermarkets Gen. Corp. v. Sills, 93 N.J. Super. 326,
225 A.2d 728 (1966); contra Pennsylvania Bd. of Pharmacy v. Pastor, 441 Pa. 186, 272
A.2d 487 (1971). The pharmacy board's arguments in Virginia Pharmacy have been
argued unsuccessfully in several state courts. See Maryland Bd. of Pharmacy v. Sav-
O-Lot, Inc., 270 Md. 103, 311 A.2d 242 (1973); Pennsylvania Bd. of Pharmacy v.
Pastor, 441 Pa. 186, 272 A.2d 487 (1971); Florida Bd. of Pharmacy v. Webb's City, Inc.,
219 So.2d 681 (Fla. 1969); all holding the regulation bore no relation to the legitimate
state end of protecting the public health. Contra, Urowsky v. Board of Regents, 46 A.2d
974, 312 N.Y.S.2d 46 (1974); Supermarkets Gen. Corp. v. Sills, 93 N.J. Super 326, 225
A.2d 728 (1966). See also Comment, Regulation of Prescription Drug Discount
Advertising, 24 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 299 (1967).
, 96 S. Ct. at 1829. The Court noted that "any pharmacist guilty of professional
dereliction that actually endangers his customers will promptly lose his license." Id.
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more professional, and hence more expensive, services will be forced
out of business by consumers seeking the lowest prices.6 The Court
noted, however, that it is just as possible that consumers, rather than
sacrificing service for price, will perceive their own interests and con-
tinue to patronize the more professional pharmacist.2 The Virginia
Pharmacy Court found that the interests of the board and the state
did not outweigh the first amendment interests in the expression, and
consequently that, prescription drug advertising is entitled to full
first amendment protection.63 Virginia Pharmacy expressly recog-
nized that advertising conveys important information even when the
advertisement is not concerned with pertinent social topics.64 This
repudiates the "public issue" rationale that New York Times and
Bigelow arguably established.65 Moreover, Virginia Pharmacy goes
beyond Bigelow by providing a framework within which the interests
of the parties must be weighed.
After Virginia Pharmacy, courts must balance the interests of the
advertiser, the consumer, and society in the advertisement against
the interest of the state in the regulation." If the combined interests
c A' Id. 1828-29.
52 Id. at 1829.
11 Id. at 1830. See also Christopher, Free Speech and the Regulation of Labeling
and Advertising, 30 FooD, DRUG, Cos. L. J. 512 (1975).
64 96 S. Ct. at 1827. Although Virginia Pharmacy accorded first amendment pro-
tection to commercial speech, the decision does not prohibit regulation of commercial
speech. See, e.g., Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 842 (1969) (upholding FCC ruling requiring radio and television stations that
carry cigarette advertising to carry antismoking messages as well); Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (state may proscribe the broadcast of defamatory
falsehoods that injure a private individual). An analogy to speech in a labor context is
helpful. The Court has long recognized the first amendment interests of the parties to
a labor dispute. See, e.g., Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945). But speech in a labor
context may be regulated in ways which would be violative of the first amendment in
other contexts. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 574, 616-20 (1969). Presumably,
commercial speech will be subject to the same treatment. 96 S. Ct. at 1830 n. 24.
" 96 S. Ct. at 1827. See text accompanying note 54 supra.
Virginia Pharmacy represents an expansion of the Meickeljohn approach to the
first amendment. See text accompanying note 55 supra. Meickeljohn would exclude
commercial speech from the protection of the first amendment because it is essentially
private and does not deal with matters of public importance. A. MEIcKEJOHN, POLM-
c AI FaEDOM 67 (1965). The matters with which commercial speech deals are no less
important to the body politic than matters of public importance, however, The Consti-
tution reserves a large amount of power in the hands of the people and restrains the
government from unduly interfering in individual affairs. The people are thus engaged
in private self-government as well as public self-government. In their private economic
affairs, the people must make decisions which involve reflection, the weighing of alter-
natives, and rational choice. The communications that help to inform this process
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of the former outweigh the interests of the state, the speech must be
afforded first amendment protection. The result is that the confusion
concerning the extent of first amendment protection for commercial
speech which existed after Pittsburgh Press and Bigelow is dispelled.
The first amendment now protects essentially all commercial speech,
but this does not mean that any restriction of commercial speech will
violate the first amendment. Commercial speech, like other forms of
protected speech, can be regulated by the state if the regulations are
justified without reference to the context of the speech, if they further
a significant governmental interest, and if they do not restrict alter-
native means of communication. 7 Moreover, false, illegal, or decep-
tive advertising may be prohibited." Essentially, commercial speech
now enters the mainstream of first amendment speech and any regu-
lation of it must meet standard first amendment tests. 9
The end of the commercial speech doctrine in Virginia Pharmacy
is especially significant to the legal profession. The decision outlines
a framework for a first amendment attack on the advertising restric-
tions on lawyers and other professionals." Many of the reasons ad-
should be protected just as the communications that inform the public governmental
process are protected. Redish, The First Amendment in the Marketplace: Commercial
Speech and the Values of Free Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 429, 435 (1971).
"1 96 S. Ct. at 1830. See, e.g., Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209
(1975); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116 (1972).
Id. at 1930-31. Compare United States v. Bob Lawrence Realty, Inc., 474 F.2d
115 (7th Cir. 1973) with FTC v. National Commission on Egg Nutrition, 517 F.2d 485
(7th Cir. 1975). See generally Developments in the Law-Deceptive Advertising, 80
HARV. L. REv. 1005 (1967). Mr. Justice Stewart, in a concurring opinion to Virginia
Pharmacy, contended that the decision called into question the legitimacy of laws
regulating false and deceptive advertising. He reasoned that the distinction between
the empirical basis of advertising claims and the non-empirical basis of non-
advertising speech resolved this issue. The truth or falsity of an advertising claim may
be empirically validated. 96 S. Ct. at 1833 (Stewart, J., concurring). In contrast, non-
commercial speech often may not be empirically validated. The Court has traditionally
allowed "breathing space" for such speech so as not to hamper free expression. Id.
There is no need to allow such space for commercial speech since the speaker possesses
the information needed to validate the advertising claim. There would be no stifling
effect if advertising claims were expected to be factually true. Accordingly, Justice
Stewart contended that Virginia Pharmacy would not affect state and federal laws
regulating the truthfulness of advertising claims. Id. at 1835 (Stewart, J., concurring).
1 96 S.Ct. at 1830. See cases cited in notes 42 & 58 supra.
10 See text accompanying notes 51-68 supra. A recent district court decision relied
on Virginia Pharmacy to strike down a Virginia statute that prohibited advertising by
physicians. Health Systems of Virginia v. Virginia Bd. of Medicine, No. 76-37-A (E.D.
Va. 1976). The court held that the interests of the state in a total ban on physician
advertising did not outweigh the interests of consumers in the information. Id. slip op.
at 17. In addition, several cases have been filed attacking the advertising ban on
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vanced by the pharmacy board in defense of their advertising prohibi-
tion have been used to defend the legal advertising ban." The legal
profession will find it difficult to justify its prohibition on advertising
with the same basic arguments that the Court found unpersuasive in
Virginia Pharmacy. Furthermore, there are strong economic and so-
cial arguments indicating that advertising legal services is beneficial
to the public and to the profession. The different functions of phar-
lawyers. See Niles v. Lowe, 407 F. Supp. 132 (D. Hawaii 1976) Bomstein v. Disciplinary
Bd., No. 76-464 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Marine v. State Bar of Wisconsin, No. 76-C-373 (E.D.
Wis. 1976); Hirshkop v. Virginia State Bar, No. 76-692-A (E.D. Va. 1975); Consumers
Union, Inc. v. American Bar Ass'n, No. 75-0105-R (E.D. Va., filed Feb. 27, 1975);
Consumers Union, Inc. v. State Bar of California, No. C-75-2385 S.C. (N.D. Cal. filed
Nov. 13, 1975); Pearson v. Bar of New York, No. 75-C-987 (E.D. N.Y., filed June 23,
1975). The efficacy of a first amendment challenge to professional advertising bans is
underscored by a comparison of the Virginia Pharmacy decision to other Supreme
Court decisions on similar issues. In North Dakota Bd. of Pharmacy v. Snyder's Drug
Stores, Inc., 414 U.S. 156 (1973), the Court upheld North Dakota's requirement that
an applicant for a license to operate a pharmacy be a licensed pharmacist. The Court
deferred to the state's power to regulate professionals in the interest of public health.
In Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, 348 U.S. 483 (1955), the Court upheld an
Oklahoma statute making it unlawful for any person not a licensed optometrist or
ophthamologist to fit lenses without prescription. The Court stated that the law may
not be proper in all respects "but it is for the legislature, not the courts, to balance
the advantages and disadvantages of the new requirement." 348 U.S. at 487. The Court
concluded that all that was necessary for the law to be constitutional was that there
be an "evil that needed correction and that the particular measure be a rational way
to remedy that evil." 348 U.S. at 488. In both Snyder and Williamson, the Court sought
only a rational basis for the regulation to uphold its constitutionality.
In Virginia Pharmacy the Court distinguished Williamson by saying that because
the instant challenge rested on first amendment grounds the justifications advanced
by the pharmacy board must be viewed in a different light. 96 S. Ct. at 1829. Presuma-
bly, this means that more than a rational basis for the regulation must be advanced.
Rather, a compelling state interest must be shown to uphold the regulation. See, e.g.,
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 615 (1969). Thus, a state must show a stronger interest
in the regulation when it is challenged on first amendment grounds. 96 S. Ct. at 1829.
See J. BARRON & C.T. DIENES CONSTITrTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POuCv (Ist ed.
1975).
See Head v. New Mexico Bd., 374 U.S. 424 (1963) (Court refused to consider first
amendment issue not raised in state court on appeal); Semler v. Dental Examiners,
294 U.S. 608 (1935) (Court upheld ban on dental advertisements as a reasonable
exercise of state's police power.) See also Freedman, Advertising and Solicitation by
Lawyers: A Proposed Redraft of Canon 2 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, 4
HOFSTRA L. R.v. 183 (1976). The specific restriction on legal advertising is found in
ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIILITY DR 2-101.
11 See generally H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHics 210-20 (1953).
72 The right to obtain meaningful access to the courts is a fundamental right
within the protection of the first amendment. United Transp. Union v. State Bar of
Michigan, 401 U.S. 576 (1971); UMW v. Illinois State Bar, 389 U.S. 217 (1967);
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macists and lawyers, however, may refute any argument based on
Virginia Pharmacy.
3
The mere invocation of that distinction will not dispose of the
case. The state cannot restrict legitimate first amendment interests
under the guise of professional regulation.74 The state must show that
its interest in the regulatlon outweighs the first amendment interests
involved. 5 This balance between legitimate professional regulation
and undue first amendment restrictions must be struck with care.
7 6
In any event, the Virginia Pharmacy decision at least showed that the
legal profession cannot rely on a commercial speech argument to
justify its advertising ban.
77
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963). Furthermore, the ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY CANON 2 (1971) places an affirmative duty on lawyers to help provide
access to the judicial system. Advertising is the best means available to communicate
the information necessary to enable Americans to recognize their need for legal services
and seek competent counsel. M. FREEDMAN, LAwER'S ETHics IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM,
118 (1975); Wilson, Madison Avenue, Meet the Bar, 61 ABA J. 586, 588 (1975); Note,
Advertising, Solicitation and the Profession's Duty to Make Legal Counsel Available,
81 YALE L.J. 1181, 1185 (1972).
Economic price theory dictates that the prices of legal services should decline due
to the increased competition among lawyers if advertising is allowed. Note, Bar Re-
strictions on the Dissemination of Information About Legal Services, 22 UCLA L. REv.
483 (1974). See generally R. POSNER, ECONoMIc ANALYSIS OF LAW (1973). Many people
unaccustomed to using a lawyer's services are apprehensive of lawyers because of what
they perceive to be the high cost of legal services. Respondents to a recent survey
overestimated the price of a lawyer's services by 91% in drawing up a will; by 123%
for thirty minutes of consultation; and by an astonishing 340% for reading and giving
advice on a two page sales contract. Curran & Spalding, The Legal Needs of the Public,
AMERIcAN BAR FOUNDATION STUDY (1974), quoted in Cochran, Legal Advertising, Don't
Panic But the Hour is At Hand, 3 BARRISTER 6 (1976).
13 In Virginia Pharmacy the parties stipulated that approximately 95% of all pre-
scriptions are filled according to dosage forms provided by the manufacturing supplier.
96 S. Ct. at 1821. This contrasts sharply with the highly discretionary work of a lawyer
where each case is different and must be handled in a different way than previous
cases. Chief Justice Burger noted this distinction in his concurring opinion. 96 S. Ct.
at 1831 n.25. (Burger, C.J., concurring).
71 NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
See text accompanying note 43 supra.
T, Hobbs, Lawyer Advertising: A Good Beginning But Not Enough, 62 ABA J. 735
(1976). See notes 72 & 73 supra.
" A first amendment attack on the advertising ban may not be necessary. The
justice department recently filed a complaint charging that the advertising prohibition
is an anti-trust violation. United States v. American Bar Ass'n, No. 76-1182 (D.D.C.
1976). Although a minimum fee schedule for title examinations was found to be price
fixing in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act, Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S.
773 (1975), the same considerations which led the Goldfarb Court to'find an antitrust
violation are not present in state advertising bans. In Goldfarb, the fact that substan-
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Although lawyers and other professionals must await the ultimate
effect of Virginia Pharmacy,"8 the effect on the commercial speech
doctrine is clear. After a confusing and unpopular history, the com-
mercial speech doctrine is dead. Advertising is now recognized as a
conveyor of information and is entitled to first amendment protec-
tion. Thus, the "marketplace of ideas", long protected by the first
amendment, now includes the commercial marketplace as well.
JOHN M. DIPIPPA
tial money to finance real estate transactions came from another state convinced the
Court that the fee schedule effected interestate commerce. Id. at 783. This flow of
money is not so apparent in the case of legal advertising. Moreover, the minimum fee
schedule in Goldfarb obviously restrained competition by producing a floor below
which no other prices for a title examination could drop. Notwithstanding the above
difficulties, state restrictions on lawyers' advertising may be exempt from antitrust
attacks as state action. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). Although the adver-
tising ban restricts the public's knowledge of the prices of legal assistance, it does not
follow that this restriction serves to hinder price competition. A lawyer may charge less
than his colleagues; he merely cannot advertise that fact. Although an antitrust ap-
proach was successful in Goldfarb, an antitrust attack on the advertising ban may not
be similarly successful.
78 The legal profession may not have to wait very long to see whether their adver-
tising ban will withstand both an antitrust and first amendment attack. A recent
Arizona decision which upheld that state's ban on lawyer advertising will be reviewed
by the Supreme Court on both the first amendment and antitrust issues. Bates v.
Arizona State Bar, No. SB-96 (Sup. Ct., July 26, 1976), cert. granted, 45 U.S. L. W.
3219 (1976).
